Incentive Design for Efficient Federated Learning in Mobile Networks: A
  Contract Theory Approach by Kang, Jiawen et al.
1Incentive Design for Efficient Federated Learning in
Mobile Networks: A Contract Theory Approach
Jiawen Kang, Zehui Xiong, Dusit Niyato, Fellow, IEEE, Han Yu, Ying-Chang Liang Fellow, IEEE
and Dong In Kim, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—To strengthen data privacy and security, federated
learning as an emerging machine learning technique is proposed
to enable large-scale nodes, e.g., mobile devices, to distributedly
train and globally share models without revealing their local data.
This technique can not only significantly improve privacy protec-
tion for mobile devices, but also ensure good performance of the
trained results collectively. Currently, most the existing studies
focus on optimizing federated learning algorithms to improve
model training performance. However, incentive mechanisms to
motivate the mobile devices to join model training have been
largely overlooked. The mobile devices suffer from considerable
overhead in terms of computation and communication during
the federated model training process. Without well-designed
incentive, self-interested mobile devices will be unwilling to join
federated learning tasks, which hinders the adoption of federated
learning. To bridge this gap, in this paper, we adopt the contract
theory to design an effective incentive mechanism for simulating
the mobile devices with high-quality (i.e., high-accuracy) data to
participate in federated learning. Numerical results demonstrate
that the proposed mechanism is efficient for federated learning
with improved learning accuracy.
Index Terms—Federated learning, contract theory, incentive
mechanism, mobile networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapidly improving computation and communica-
tion capabilities of mobile devices, many novel mobile appli-
cations based on machine learning techniques, e.g., Google
Translate APP, are emerging to bring excellent experience to
mobile users [1]. Although the machine learning techniques
dramatically enhance the performance of mobile applications,
traditional machine learning techniques require mobile devices
to directly upload user data with potentially sensitive private
information to a central server for model training [2]. This
causes not only large computation and storage overhead, but
also serious risk of privacy breach due to the centralized
entity suffering from single point of failure [3]. To solve
these challenges, an emerging distributed machine learning
technique named federated learning is introduced to allow
mobile devices to jointly train a shared global model in a
decentralized manner. The mobile devices only send local
model updates trained on their local raw data to a task
publisher of federated learning without uploading any raw
data, thus decoupling the machine learning from acquiring,
storing and training data in a central server [4].
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With the significant advantages in privacy protection, fed-
erated learning has attracted increasing attention from re-
searchers and developers recently. Google designed a virtual
keyboard application named Gboard for smart phones by using
federated learning [5]. The authors in [1] further discussed
architecture and potential applications about federated learn-
ing. The authors in [4] formulated an optimization problem of
federated learning over wireless networks to obtain optimal
learning time, accuracy level, and energy cost. A deep Q
learning algorithm is used to solve the optimal data and energy
management problems of federated learning without prior
knowledge of network dynamics in [6]. Considering clients
with heterogeneous resources, the authors in [7] proposed
a client selection scheme for federated learning based on a
greedy algorithm.
The aforementioned studies have specifically focused on
optimizing the performance of federated learning algorithms,
e.g., learning time or energy cost. However, the most existing
work made an optimistic assumption that all the mobile
devices will unconditionally participate in federated learn-
ing when invited [8], [9], which is not practical in the
real world due to resource costs incurred by model training
[10]. Without well-designed economic compensation, the self-
interested mobile devices will be reluctant to participate in
federated learning [4], [9]. Moreover, there exist the following
information asymmetry issues between the task publisher and
the mobile devices. I) The task publisher does not know the
amount of available computation resources and the data sizes
from mobile devices for model training. II) The local data
quality of a mobile device is unknown to the task publisher due
to the lack of prior knowledge. As a result, the task publisher
may incur a high cost when providing incentives to the mobile
devices. Therefore, it is essential for the task publishers to
design an efficient incentive mechanism to reduce the impact
of information asymmetry [1], [6].
In this paper, to attract mobile devices with high-quality
data to join federated learning and overcome the information
asymmetry issue, we adopt the contract theory to design
an efficient incentive mechanism that maps the contributed
resources into appropriate rewards. The data owners (i.e.,
mobile devices) with larger-accuracy local data and more
resource contributions can obtain more rewards from the task
publisher. Each data owner chooses its desired contract item to
maximize its profit [10]. The main contributions of this paper
are listed as follows:
• We design an effective incentive mechanism using con-
tract theory to stimulate mobile devices to join federated
model training under information asymmetry.
• To attract data owners with high-quality data, we define
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2the accuracy-related parameter of local data as the type
of the contract model. The higher type data owners that
have larger accuracy local data can receive more rewards.
• We perform the real-world experiments using the well-
known digit classification dataset to demonstrate that the
proposed mechanism outperforms existing approaches.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The problem
formulation and solutions for contract theory model are in-
troduced in Section II and Section III, respectively. Numerical
results are presented in Section IV followed by the conclusions
in Section V.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Similar to that in [4], we consider a universal mobile
network with wireless communication infrastructures and a set
of mobile devices. These widely distributed communication
infrastructures, e.g., base stations, can act as task publishers
with federated learning tasks, while the mobile devices are
data owner candidates for the learning tasks. The mobile
devices equipped with advanced computation and communi-
cation functions can not only generate diverse user data from
mobile applications, but also collect a lot of sensing data. Each
task publisher designs contract items for incentivizing mobile
devices with high-quality data to join federated learning. Every
data owner iteratively trains a shared global model with local
model updates generated using their private local data. Then,
all the data owners upload their local model updates to the task
publisher for updating the global model. The training process
is repeated until the accuracy of the global model achieves a
pre-defined, desirable value. More details about the basics of
federated learning can be found in [4], [2].
A. Computation Model for Federated Learning
We consider a federated learning task as a monopoly market
with a monopolist operator (a task publisher) and a set of
mobile devices N = {1, . . . , N}. Each data owner n ∈ N
with a local training dataset uses a size sn of its local data
samples to participate in the federated learning task. There is
an input-output pair in each data sample, in which the input
is a sample vector with various data features and the output
is the label value for the input generated through mobile apps
[4]. The contributed computation resources for local model
training, i.e., CPU cycle frequency, from the data owner n is
denoted as fn. The number of CPU cycles for a data owner n
to perform local model training using a single data sample 1 is
denoted by cn. Hence, for data owner n, the computation time
of a local iteration in local model training is cnsnfn . According
to [4], the CPU energy consumption for one local iteration is
Ecmpn (fn) = ζcnsnf
2
n, where ζ is the effective capacitance
parameter of the computing chipset for data owner n.
B. Communication Model for Federated Learning
For a federated learning task, all the participating data
owners collaborate to train a shared global model and achieve a
1We consider that each data sample has the same data size.
global accuracy level of learning by an iterative method with
a number of communication rounds (i.e., global iterations).
During a global iteration, the data owners send their own
local model updates to the task publisher through wireless
communications. Each local model update achieves a local
accuracy of εn corresponding to the local data quality of data
owner n. Note that a higher local accuracy leads to fewer local
and global iterations [11]. Given the target local accuracy, the
number of local iterations is log( 1εn ) [4], [11]. The computa-
tion time of a local iteration and uplink communication time2
of a local model update are involved in a global iteration.
The computation time of a local iteration by data owner n
is denoted by T cmpn =
cnsn
fn
. For the communication time
of local model updates, time-sharing multi-access protocols,
e.g., Time-Division Medium Access (TDMA) technology, are
taken into consideration in this paper. We consider that the
locations of data owners are fixed when transmitting local
model parameters. The transmission rate of data owner n
is denoted as rn = Bln(1 + ρnhnN0 ) [4]. Here, B is the
transmission bandwidth and ρn is the transmission power of
the data owner n. hn is the channel gain of peer-to-peer
link between data owner n and the task publisher. N0 is the
background noise. We consider the data size of a local model
update σ to be a constant with the same value for all data
owners. The transmission time of a local model update with
size σ is expressed by T comn =
σ
Bln(1+ ρnhnN0
)
.
Therefore, the total time of participating in one global
iteration for the data owner n is denoted as
T tn = log(
1
εn
)T cmpn + T
com
n . (1)
According to [4], the energy consumption by data owner
n to transmit local model updates in a global iteration is
expressed as Ecomn = T
com
n · ρn = σρnB ln(1+ ρnhnN0 )
. Therefore,
for a global iteration, the total energy consumption of the data
owner n is denoted as follows:
Etn = log(
1
εn
)Ecmpn + E
com
n . (2)
C. Profit Function of the Task Publisher
To attract more data owners with high-quality data (i.e.,
high-accuracy and reliable local data), we define a parameter
about data quality as the type of a data owner n, which is
denoted as
θn =
ψ
log( 1εn )
. (3)
Here, ψ is the coefficient about the number of local model
iterations affected by the local data accuracy. The data owners
are divided into M types sorted in ascending order of data
quality: θ1 < · · · < θm < · · · < θM ,m ∈ {1, . . . ,M}.
A larger θm means better quality of local data with higher
accuracy leading to fewer local model iterations [12], [7].
Although the task publisher does not know exactly true type
of a given data owner, it has the knowledge of the probability
2We consider that the downlink time between the task publisher and the data
owners is negligible compared with the uplink time as typically the downlink
bandwidth is much larger than the uplink bandwidth.
3that a data owner belongs to a certain type-m [13] and∑M
m=1 pm = 1. The task publisher can obtain the distribution
of data owner types from previous observations [14].
Due to information asymmetry, the task publisher should
design specific contracts for different types of data owners
with different levels of data quality to increase its profits.
The task publisher offers different resource-reward bundles to
the data owners according to their types. For different data
owners with different computation resources, i.e., CPU cycle
frequency, the task publisher offers the contract (Rn(fn), fn)
including a series of resource-reward bundles. Here, fn is the
computation resource of type-n a data owner and Rn(fn) is the
corresponding reward for the data owner. The more contributed
computation resource leads to faster local model training, thus
bringing higher rewards. The data owners choose and sign one
of the provided contracts at will and finish the given federated
learning task. If a data owner cannot finish the learning task
or misbehaves, the task publisher will put the data owner into
a blacklist and withhold payment.
For a signed contract (Rn(fn), fn), we define the profit
of the task publisher obtained from a type-n data owner as
UTP (Rn) = ω ln(Tmax − T tn) − lRn, where ω > 0 is
the satisfaction degree parameter of task publisher. Tmax is
the task publisher’s maximum tolerance time of federated
learning, and l is the unit cost about the rewards for the data
owners. [ω ln(Tmax − T tn)] is the satisfaction function of the
task publisher regarding the total time of one global iteration
for type-n data owner. Note that both the higher accuracy
(higher type) and larger CPU cycle frequency can improve the
profit for the task publisher, i.e., ∂UTP∂εn > 0,
∂UTP
∂θn
> 0 and
∂UTP
∂fn
> 0. Moreover, for the task publisher, more high-type
data owners joining the federated learning leads to more profit,
but also incurs larger reward cost lRn. Apparently, the task
publisher will not accept a negative profit when performing
the federated learning task, i.e., UTP (Rn) ≥ 0. The objective
of the task publisher is to maximize its profit in the federated
learning task defined as follows:
max
(Rn,fn)
UTP =
N∑
n=1
Npn·w ln[Tmax − ( σB ln(1+ pnhnN0 )
+
ψ
θn
· cnsnfn )]− lRn.
(4)
D. Utility Function of Data Owners
The utility function of a type-n data owner for the signed
contract (Rn(fn), fn) is defined as: UD(fn) = Rn − µEtn =
Rn − µ
[
ψ
θn
ζcnsnf
2
n + E
com
n
]
, where µ is a pre-defined
weight parameter for energy consumption. We consider that
every data owner is self-interested and the valuation of UD
is zero when there is no reward [13]. Intuitively, the higher-
type data owners have larger utility since they provide better
quality data. The data owner also wishes to minimize energy
consumption when performing the federated learning task for
maximizing its utility. The overall goal of a type-n data owner
is expressed by
max
(Rn,fn)
UD = Rn − µ
[
ψ
θn
ζcnsnf
2
n +
σρn
B ln(1 + ρnhnN0 )
]
. (5)
III. OPTIMAL CONTRACT DESIGNING
With information asymmetry, to make contracts feasible,
each contract must satisfy the following constraints: i) Indi-
vidual Rationality (IR) and ii) Incentive Compatibility (IC) in
order to ensure that each type of data owners are properly
motivated [13].
Definition 1. Individual Rationality: A data owner only
participates in the federated learning task when its utility is
not less than zero, i.e.,
UD = Rn − µ
[
ψ
θn
ζcnsnf
2
n +
σρn
B ln(1 + ρnhnN0 )
]
≥ 0. (6)
Definition 2. Incentive Compatibility: To maximize utility,
every data owner can only choose the contract designed for
itself, i.e., type θn instead of any other contracts (Rm, fm),
i.e.,
Rn − µ[ ψθn ζcnsnf2n +
σρn
B ln(1+ ρnhnN0
)
] ≥ Rm − µ[ ψθm ζcnsnf2n
+ σρn
B ln(1+ ρnhnN0
)
],∀n,m ∈ {1, . . . , N}, n 6= m.
(7)
In what follows, for simplicity, we consider µ = 1. Without
loss of generality, we consider the transmission bandwidth,
transmission power, and the channel gain for all the data
owners to be identical due to similar wireless communication
environments [4], and thus we have Ecom1 = · · · = Ecomn =
σρ0
B ln(1+
ρ0h0
N0
)
, n ∈ {1, . . . , N}. For ease of presentation, the
optimization problems in (4) and (5) can be reformulated as
max
(Rn,fn)
UTP =
N∑
n=1
Npn
[
w ln(Tmax − T comn − ψT
cmp
n
θn
)− lRn
]
,
s.t.
Rn − ( ψθnEcmpn + Ecomn ) ≥ 0,∀n ∈ {1, . . . , N},
Rn − ( ψθnEcmpn + Ecomn ) ≥ Rm − (
ψ
θn
Ecmpm + E
com
m ),
∀n,m ∈ {1, . . . , N}, n 6= m,
cnsn
fn
≤ Tmax,∀n ∈ {1, . . . , N} ,
N∑
n=1
N · pn ·Rn ≤ Rmax,∀n ∈ {1, . . . , N} ,
(8)
where Rmax is the total reward budget of the task publisher.
Although the problem in (8) is not a convex optimization
problem, its solution can be found by performing the following
transformation.
According to the above definitions, we have the following
lemmas.
Lemma 1 (Monotonicity). For contract (Rn, fn) and
(Rm, fm), we have fn ≥ fm and Rn ≥ Rm, if and only
if θn ≥ θm, n 6= m, and n,m ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
Lemma 2. If the IR constraint of type-1 is satisfied, the
other IR constraints will also hold.
Lemma 3. According to the monotonicity in Lemma 1, the
IC condition can be reduced as the Local Downward Incentive
Constraints (LDIC) that is expressed as Rn − ψθnEcmpn ≥
Rn−1 − ψθnE
cmp
n−1,∀n ∈ {2, . . . , N}.
The proofs of Lemma 1, 2, and 3 are similar to those in the
[12]. Based on the analysis of these lemmas, the optimization
problem in (8) is simplified as follows:
4max
(Rn,fn)
UTP =
N∑
n=1
Npn
[
w ln(Tmax − T comn − ψT
cmp
n
θn
)− lRn
]
,
s.t.
Rn − ψθnEcmpn − Ecomn = 0,∀n ∈ {1, ..., N},
Rn − ψθnEcmpn = Rn−1 −
ψ
θn
Ecmpn−1,∀n ∈ {2, ..., N},
cnsn
fn
≤ Tmax,∀n ∈ {1, . . . , N} ,
N∑
n=1
N · pn ·Rn ≤ Rmax,∀n ∈ {1, . . . , N} .
(9)
To derive the optimal contracts in the problem (9), we
first solve the relaxed problem in (9) without monotonicity
constraint. Subsequently, this acquired solution is checked
whether it satisfies the monotonicity condition. By using the
iterative method on IC and IR constraints, we can obtain the
reward which is expressed as Rn = Ecomn +
ψEcmp1
θ1
+
n∑
k=1
∆k,
where ∆k =
ψEcmpk
θk
− ψE
cmp
k−1
θk
and ∆1 = 0. By substituting
Rn into
N∑
n=1
N · pn · lRn, we can obtain
N∑
n=1
N · pn · lRn = NlEcomn +Nlζ
N∑
n=1
gncnsnf
2
n, (10)
where gn =
 ψPnθn + ( ψθn − 1θn+1 )
N∑
i=n+1
pi, n < N,
ψPN
θN
, n = N.
By substituting (10) into the problem in (9) and also
removing all Rn, we can rewrite (9) as
max
(Rn,fn)
UTP =
N∑
n=1
Npn
[
w ln(Tmax − σB ln(1+ ρnhnNn ) −
ψcnsn
fnθn
)
]
− Nlσρn
B ln(1+ ρnhnNn )
−Nlζ
N∑
n=1
cnsngnf
2
n,
s.t.
cnsn
Tmax
≤ fn,∀n ∈ {1, . . . , N} ,
Nσρn
B ln(1+ ρnhnNn )
+Nζ
N∑
n=1
cnsngnf
2
n ≤ Rmax,∀n ∈ {1, . . . , N} .
(11)
By differentiating UTP with respect to fn, we can obtain
∂2UTP
∂f2n
< 0, and thus UTP is concave. The summation of
concave functions (UTP ) is still a concave function, and hence
the problem in (11) with affine constraints is a concave opti-
mization problem. With the help of convex optimization tools,
e.g., CVX, we can calculate the optimal computation resource,
i.e., contributed CPU-cycle f∗n and the corresponding incentive
R∗n [12]. In addition, the monotonicity can be automatically
met when the types of data owners follow uniform distribution.
If the distribution of data owners’ types is not uniform, we can
utilize the infeasible sub-sequence replacing algorithm to meet
the final optimal computation resource requirement [12], [15].
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In the simulation, a well-known digit classification dataset
named MNIST is used to evaluate the performance of the
proposed incentive schemes. This dataset includes 60,000
training examples and 10,000 test examples, which can be
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Fig. 2: Utilities of data owners with different contract items.
used to perform a digit classification task. We consider a task
publisher and 100 data owners in the federated learning tasks.
The data owners are randomly assigned a training set following
a uniform distribution over 10 classes as their own local
training data. The accuracy of local data ranges from 20% to
92%. The CPU cycles of performing a data sample cn is 5 and
the size of data samples sn is 20. The transmission time T comn
and energy consumption Ecomn for transmitting a local model
update are 10 and 20, respectively. The maximum tolerance
time Tmax and the total amount of given reward Rmax of
a federated learning task are 600 and 10,000, respectively.
Moreover, the data owners are initially classified into 10 types
according to accuracy-related parameters of local training data,
and the probability for a candidate belonging to a certain type
is 0.1 [12].
To show the impacts of the variation range of local training
data accuracy on the profit of task publisher, we vary the upper
limit of local data accuracy (i.e., a parameter related to the
data owner type) from 98% to 78%, respectively. As shown
in Fig. 1, the profit of the task publisher decreases with the
decrease of the upper limit of local data accuracy. As reducing
upper limit of the local data accuracy means that the number of
high-type data owners is decreasing. Therefore, the low-quality
of local training data has a negative impact on the profit of the
task publisher. Therefore, the proposed schemes can stimulate
data owners with high-quality data to join learning tasks, hence
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Fig. 3: The profit of a task publisher with respect to different
total number of data owner types
leading to more efficient federated learning.
To validate the feasibility, i.e., IR and IC, of the proposed
scheme under information asymmetry, we present Fig. 2 to
show the utilities of data owners with types 2, 4, 6 and
8, respectively [15]. From Fig. 2, we observe that all types
of data owners can only achieve their own maximum utility
when they choose the contract item exactly designed for their
types, which explains the IC constraint [12]. Moreover, each
data owner can obtain nonnegative utility when selecting the
contract item corresponding to its type, which validates the IR
constraint.
We compare the profit of the task publisher obtained from
the proposed contract theory model, and that from the Stackel-
berg game model in [15]. Figure 3 shows that the larger total
number of data owner types leads to the larger profit of a task
publisher. The more data owner types bring more contract item
choices to high-type data owners, thus ensuring more efficient
federated learning. For a certain number of data owner types,
the profit of the task publisher in the proposed contract model
is higher than that of the Stackelberg game model [12]. The
reason is that, in the monopoly market, the task publisher
working as the monopolist only provides limited contract items
to the data owners and extracts more profit from the data
owners. Nevertheless, in the Stackelberg game model, rational
data owners can optimize their individual utilities resulting in
less profit for the task publisher. Although the task publisher
needs to consider the IR and IC constraints during designing
the contract items, these constraints have small impact on
maximizing the utilities of the data owners compared with the
Stackelberg game model [16]. As a result, the task publisher
can obtain the higher profit than that in the Stackelberg game
models [12]. Moreover, the Stackelberg game model with
symmetric information has better performance than that of
Stackelberg game model with asymmetric information. The
reason is that the game leader (the task publisher) in the
Stackelberg game with symmetric information can optimize
its profit because of knowledge about the actions of followers
(data owners), i.e., the symmetric information, and set the
utilities of the followers to zero [15].
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we designed a contract theory-based incentive
mechanism to motivate data owners that have high-accuracy
local training data to join the learning processes for efficient
federated learning. Numerical results have indicated that the
proposed incentive scheme can attract more data owners with
high-quality local training data to ensure efficient federated
learning and also optimize the utilities of both the task
publishers and the data owners. For further work, we will
consider using blockchains to ensure reliability of local model
updates when formulating the incentive mechanism for reliable
federated learning in mobile networks [17], [18].
REFERENCES
[1] Q. Yang, Y. Liu, T. Chen, and Y. Tong, “Federated machine learning:
Concept and applications,” ACM Transactions on Intelligent Systems and
Technology (TIST), vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 12:1–12:15, 2019.
[2] H. Zhu and Y. Jin, “Multi-objective evolutionary federated learning,”
arXiv preprint arXiv:1812.07478, 2018.
[3] X. Zhu, H. Li, and Y. Yu, “Blockchain-based privacy preserving
deep learning,” 2018. Available: http://xxhb.fjnu.edu.cn/ upload/tpl/06/
5d/1629/template1629/papers/83.pdf.
[4] H. T. Nguyen, B. Wei, Z. Albert, N. N. Minh, and H. Choong Seon,
“Federated learning over wireless networks: Optimization model design
and analysis,” in IEEE INFOCOM 2019, Paris, France, April 2019.
[5] A. Hard, K. Rao, R. Mathews, F. Beaufays, S. Augenstein, H. Eichner,
C. Kiddon, and D. Ramage, “Federated learning for mobile keyboard
prediction,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1811.03604, 2018.
[6] T. T. Anh, N. C. Luong, D. Niyato, D. I. Kim, and L.-C. Wang, “Efficient
training management for mobile crowd-machine learning: A deep rein-
forcement learning approach,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1812.03633, 2018.
[7] T. Nishio and R. Yonetani, “Client selection for federated learn-
ing with heterogeneous resources in mobile edge,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1804.08333, 2018.
[8] M. Shayan, C. Fung, C. J. Yoon, and I. Beschastnikh, “Biscotti: A ledger
for private and secure peer-to-peer machine learning,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1811.09904, 2018.
[9] H. Kim, J. Park, M. Bennis, and S.-L. Kim, “On-device feder-
ated learning via blockchain and its latency analysis,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1808.03949, 2018.
[10] Z. Zhou, P. Liu, J. Feng, Y. Zhang, S. Mumtaz, and J. Rodriguez,
“Computation resource allocation and task assignment optimization in
vehicular fog computing: A contract-matching approach,” IEEE Trans-
actions on Vehicular Technology, in press, 2019.
[11] J. Konecˇny`, H. B. McMahan, D. Ramage, and P. Richta´rik, “Federated
optimization: Distributed machine learning for on-device intelligence,”
arXiv preprint arXiv:1610.02527, 2016.
[12] J. Kang, Z. Xiong, D. Niyato, D. Ye, D. I. Kim, and J. Zhao, “Toward
secure blockchain-enabled internet of vehicles: Optimizing consensus
management using reputation and contract theory,” IEEE Transactions
on Vehicular Technology, vol. 68, pp. 2906–2920, March 2019.
[13] Y. Zhang, L. Liu, Y. Gu, D. Niyato, M. Pan, and Z. Han, “Offloading
in software defined network at edge with information asymmetry: A
contract theoretical approach,” Journal of Signal Processing Systems,
vol. 83, no. 2, pp. 241–253, 2016.
[14] M. Zeng, Y. Li, K. Zhang, M. Waqas, and D. Jin, “Incentive mechanism
design for computation offloading in heterogeneous fog computing: A
contract-based approach,” in 2018 IEEE International Conference on
Communications (ICC), pp. 1–6, IEEE, 2018.
[15] Z. Hou, H. Chen, Y. Li, and B. Vucetic, “Incentive mechanism design
for wireless energy harvesting-based internet of things,” IEEE Internet
of Things Journal, vol. 5, no. 4, pp. 2620–2632, 2018.
[16] T. Liu, J. Li, F. Shu, M. Tao, W. Chen, and Z. Han, “Design of contract-
based trading mechanism for a small-cell caching system,” IEEE Trans-
actions on Wireless Communications, vol. 16, no. 10, pp. 6602–6617,
2017.
[17] Y. Dai, D. Xu, S. Maharjan, Z. Chen, Q. He, and Y. Zhang, “Blockchain
and deep reinforcement learning empowered intelligent 5g beyond,”
IEEE Network Magazine, vol. 33, no. 3, 2019.
[18] H. Liu, Y. Zhang, and T. Yang, “Blockchain-enabled security in electric
vehicles cloud and edge computing,” IEEE Network, vol. 32, no. 3,
pp. 78–83, 2018.
